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LIST OF ALL PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING
Plaintiff7Appellant, Laina Roundy ("Roundy").
Defendant/Appellee, Travis Staley ("Staley").
Thor B. Roundy and Anastasia Roundy, the husband and daughter of Laina
Roundy, were original parties to this action. Their claims, which were based upon the theory of
loss of consortium, were summarily dismissed. Neil Staley, Travis Staley's father, was also
initially a defendant to the action. Roundy's claims against Neil Staley, which were based upon
a theory of negligent entrustment, were also summarily dismissed. The trial court's orders
regarding the dismissal of these parties are not before this Court on appeal.
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This matter is an appeal from afinaljudgment and order of the Third Judicial
District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah The Judgment reflecting the jury verdict was
entered on July 11,1997 The Order Denying Roundy's Motion for New Trial was entered on
November 4, 1997 The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Rule
42(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure and Utah Code Annotated § 78-2(a)-3(2)Q) The
Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code Annotated
§ 78-2-20)

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Did the District Court properly allow Staley to present surveillance video

evidence of Roundy at trial in order to rebut Roundy's credibility and testimony regarding the
extent of her injuries?
In reviewing questions of the admissibility of evidence that do not involve the
balancing of specified factors this Court employs a correctness standard. Cal Wadsworth Const.
v. City of St. George, 898 P.2d 1372 (Utah 1995); UtahDept. of Trans, v. 6200 South Asso., 872
P.2d 462 (Ut. Ct. App. 1994); Turner v. General Adjustment Bureau, Inc., 832 P.2d 62 (Ut. Ct.
App. 1992).
2.

Did the District Court commit reversible error by denying Roundy's

Motion for New Trial based upon Rule 59(a)(3) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure which
provides that a district court "may" grant a new trial on the basis of "[a]ccident or surprise,
which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against," because the District Court allowed
Staley to present surveillance video evidence of Roundy to rebut her credibility and testimony
regarding the extent of her injuries?
The granting or refusal to grant a new trial is a matter of broad discretion of the
trial court. Haslam v. Paulsen, 389 P.2d 736 (Utah 1964); Page v. Utah Home Fire Ins. Co., 391
P.2d 290 (Utah 1964). Thus, the trial court's decision will be reversed on appeal only for an
abuse of discretion. Smith v. Shreeve, 551 P.2d 1261 (Utah 1976); Scmidtv. Intermountain
Health Care, Inc., 635 P.2d 99 (Utah 1981).
2

3.

Did the District Court commit reversible error by denying Roundy's

Motion for New Trial based upon Rule 59(a)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure which
provides that a district court "may" grant a new trial on the basis of "irregularity in the
proceedings" and because the District Court allowed Staley to present surveillance video
evidence of Roundy to rebut her credibility and testimony regarding the extent of her injuries?
The trial court's decision to refuse to grant a new trial will be reversed on appeal
only for an abuse of discretion. Smith v. Shreeve, 551 P.2d 1261 (Utah 1976); Scmidt v.
Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 635 P.2d 99 (Utah 1981).
4.

Did the District Court commit reversible error by denying Roundy's

Motion for New Trial based upon Rule 59(a)(7) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure which
provides that a District Court "may" grant a new trial on the basis of "error in the law," because
the District Court allowed Staley to present surveillance video evidence of Roundy to rebut her
credibility and testimony regarding the extent of her injuries?
The trial court's decision to refuse to grant a new trial will be reversed on appeal
only for an abuse of discretion. Smith v. Shreeve, 551 P.2d 1261 (Utah 1976); Scmidt v.
Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 635 P.2d 99 (Utah 1981).
5.

Did the District Court commit reversible error in granting Staley's Motion

for Directed Verdict on Roundy's cause of action for punitive damages?
Reversal of a trial court's grant of directed verdict is required only if reasonable
men could arrive at a different conclusion. Rhiness v. Dansie, All P.2d 428 (Utah 1970);
3

Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 789 (Utah 1991); Onyeabor v. Pro Roofing, Inc., 787 P.2d
525 (Ut. Ct. App. 1990).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This action arises from an automobile accident that occurred on May 18, 1994 in
Salt Lake County, Utah. The accident took place at the intersection of Redwood Road and the
1-80 on/off ramp. (Tr. of May 13, 1997 proceedings at 30.) Just prior to the accident Staley's
vehicle approached the intersection traveling northbound on Redwood Road. (Tr. of May 14,
1997 proceedings at 78.) Roundy's vehicle was traveling southbound on Redwood Road. (Tr.
of May 13, 1997 proceedings at 31-32.) The accident occurred as Roundy made a left turn
through the intersection on to the 1-80 on ramp across the path of Staley's vehicle. (Tr. of
may 13 1997 proceedings at 34.) Of primary dispute at trial was the color of the traffic signal
governing the intersection at the time that Roundy made her left turn, and at the time that Staley
entered the intersection. As a result of the accident Roundy claims to have sustained cervical
soft tissue injuries. She also complained of injuries to her head, arm, back and chest. (Tr. of
May 13, 1997 proceedings at 57-62.)
On October 19, 1994 Roundy submitted Plaintiffs' First Set of Interrogatories,
Requests for Production of Documents and Things and Requests for Admissions to Defendants
("written discovery requests"). (Addendum to Roundy's Opening Brief.) Roundy's written
discovery requests, and Staley's responses thereto include the following:
4

INTERROGATORY NO. 2: Identify all witnesses you intend to
call on your behalf at trial in this matter. Include in your answer a
brief summary of their proposed testimony.
ANSWER: OBJECTION. Discovery is on-going and counsel for
defendant has not yet made decisions about which witnesses may
be called at trial. Counsel for defendant will comply with the
court's order for designating witnesses at the time designated by
the court. Without waiving that objection, it is anticipated at this
time that defense counsel will call: plaintiffs, defendants Neil
Staley and Travis Staley, Melodie Kraft, Officer Hawk, Maryann
Jiminez, expert witnesses as yet undetermined and undoubtedly
others.
INTERROGATORY NO. 3: Identify all individuals who may
have information concerning the allegations of Plaintiffs
Complaint and Defendant's Answer. Include in your answer a
brief summary of the information which they may have.
ANSWER: Plaintiff would best know who has information about
their Complaint. As to defendants' Answer, Objection: The
answer was prepared by counsel, and is the product of counsel's
mental impressions and legal analysis; as such the information
requested is protected as work product pursuant to Utah Rule of
Civil Procedure 26(b)(3). As to the general subject matter of this
litigation, plaintiffs, defendants Neil Staley and Travis Staley,
Officer Hawk, Melodie Kraft, Maryann Jiminez, plaintiffs treating
physicians and undoubtedly others.
INTERROGATORY NO. 4: Identify all individuals you plan to
use as expert witnesses at trial in this matter. Include in your
answer a copy of their resume or curriculum vitae, and a brief
summary of their proposed testimony.
ANSWER: OBJECTION. Discovery is on-going and counsel for
defendant has not yet made decisions about expert witnesses that
may be called at trial. Counsel for defendant will comply with the
court's order for designating witnesses at the time designated by
the court. Without waiving that objection, it is anticipated at this
5

time that defense counsel will call an accident ^constructionist,
one or more medical experts, who are undetermined at this time,
and one or more medical experts who will perform Independent
Medical Examinations; other experts may likely be called as well.
INTERROGATORY NO. 6: Identify all documents (in the detail
required by "Definitions" paragraph 5, above) you intend to use on
your behalf at trial in this matter.
ANSWER: OBJECTION. This discovery is on-going and counsel
for defendant has not yet made decisions about which exhibits may
be used at trial. Counsel for defendant will comply with the
court's order for providing exhibits or exhibit lists at the time
designated by the court.
None of Roundy's interrogatories asked specifically if Staley had a surveillance
video tape of Roundy or regarding the existence of surveillance evidence at all. None of
Roundy's request for production of documents asked Staley to produce copies of the surveillance
video tape or other surveillance evidence. Roundy never filed a motion to compel additional
discovery sought pursuant to her First Set of Interrogatories, Request for Production of
Documents and Things and Request for Admissions to Defendants. Id
On September 25, 1996, Roundy submitted a Rule 26(e) Request for
Supplementation. On November 13, 1996, Staley provided his responses thereto. (Addendum to
Roundy's Opening Brief.) Roundy's supplemental written discovery requests and Staley's
responses thereto include the following:
INTERROGATORY NO. 2: Identify all witnesses you intend to
call on your behalf at trial on this matter. Include in your answer a
brief summary of their proposed testimony.

6

ANSWER: Counsel for defendant has not yet made decisions
about which witnesses may be called at trial. Counsel for
defendant will comply with the court's order for designating
witnesses at the time designated by the court. Without waiving
that objection, it is anticipated at this time that defense will call:
Laina Roundy, Travis Staley, Melodie Kraft, Officer Hawk,
Maryann Jiminez, Anita Sanchez and undoubtedly others.
INTERROGATORY NO. 4: Identify all individuals you plan to
use as expert witnesses at trial in this matter. Include in your
answer a copy of their resume or curriculum vitae, and a brief
summary of their proposed testimony.
ANSWER. OBJECTION. Discovery is on-going and counsel for
defendant has not made decisions about expert witnesses that may
be called at trial. Counsel for defendant will comply with the
court's order for designating witnesses at the time designated by
the court. Without waiving that objection, it is anticipated at this
time that defense counsel will call Ronald L. Probert, accident
^constructionist, Gerald Moress, M.D., and other experts may
likely be called as well.
INTERROGATORY NO. 6: Identify all documents (in the detail
required by "Definitions" paragraph 5 above) you intend to use on
your behalf at trial on this matter.
ANSWER: Discovery is on-going and counsel for defendant has
not yet made decisions about which exhibits may be used at trial.
Counsel for defendant will comply with the court's order for
providing exhibits or exhibit lists at the time designated by the
court. Without waiving that objection, defendant may use the
following exhibits at trial: a diagram of the accident scene
involved in the subject accident; defendant may use a computer
animation/recreation of the subject accident; photographs of the
accident scene; portions of plaintiff s medical records and medical
expenses, including extracts and summaries of such; copies,
redacted as necessary, of the investigating officers' reports,
diagrams and statements; Photographs of the defendant's vehicle;
Photographs of the plaintiffs vehicle; Repair Records of the
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parties' vehicles; Income, benefits and employment records of
plaintiff, including extracts and summaries of such; IME reports;
Expert's reports; Defendant reserves the right to submit additional
exhibits obtained from materials in conjunction with formal
discovery in this matter; Defendant reserves the right to submit
additional exhibits as needed for rebuttal of plaintiffs claims;
Defendant reserves the right to submit additional exhibits prepared
from the date of this Supplemental Answer to Interrogatories and
the date of trial.
None of Roundy's supplemental written discovery requests specifically asked
Staley to identify or provide surveillance evidence. Once again, Roundy did not submit a motion
to compel discovery responses from Staley for which she was dissatisfied. Id,
The trial court did not order a deadline for the parties to designate fact or expert
witnesses. The trial court did not impose a deadline for the parties to designate trial exhibits.
(Scheduling Order, Addendum.)
During the first day of trial, counsel for Staley identified Mr. Ronald Gunderson
("Gunderson") as a "possible" rebuttal witness that might be called during trial. (Tr. of May 9,
1997 proceedings at 13.) Gunderson is a private investigator who obtained surveillance video
tape evidence of Roundy that was probative as to her damage claims. (Tr. of May 14, 1997
proceedings at 218.) Specifically, the surveillance video tape shows Roundy engaged in
physical activities that contradict her claims of physical injuries and physical limitations. (Tr. of
May 14, 1997 proceedings at 22.) Gunderson was ultimately called as a rebuttal witness to lay
foundation for the video tape. (Tr. of May 14, 1997 proceedings at 218-223.) The surveillance
video tape was also shown to Dr. Gerald Moress who had performed an independent medical
8

examination of Roundy. (Tr. of May 14, 1997 proceedings at 22.) Based upon his review of the
videotape, and his examination of Roundy, Dr. Moress concluded that Roundy's physical
injuries and limitations were not as severe as Roundy had indicated during his meeting with her.
Id.
Roundy presented evidence in support her case during three days of the four-day
trial. As Roundy notes, the overwhelming evidence presented established that the traffic signal
was green or yellow for Staley as he entered the intersection where the accident took place.
(Roundy's Opening Brief at 8-9.) As a result, Roundy had an obligation to yield to Staley.
(Utah Code Ann. section 41-6-73). After the presentation of Roundy's case, Staley moved for a
directed verdict on Roundy's claim for punitive damages. (Tr. of May 14, 1997 proceedings at
91-92.) The trial court granted the motion. (Tr. of May 14, 1997 proceedings at 95-96.) At the
conclusion of trial, the jury determined that Roundy was 60% at fault for the accident.
(Judgment, Addendum.) Because Roundy's fault exceeded that of Staley's, the jury did not
address the issue of damages. Id. Judgment was entered on July 11, 1997. Id. Roundy
subsequently filed her Motion for New Trial which was denied by the trial court on November 4,
1997. (Order on Plaintiffs Motion for New Trial, Addendum.)
Roundy has filed this appeal on the basis that even though she did not inquire
regarding the existence of a surveillance video tape or surveillance evidence in her initial and
supplemental written discovery requests, and even though she did not file a motion to compel
additional discovery from Staley for those discovery responses that she now asserts were
9

inadequate, the trial court erred by admitting the surveillance video tape evidence and the related
foundational testimony from Gunderson. Roundy also asserts on appeal that the trial court erred
by granting Staley's motion for directed verdict on Roundy's claim for punitive damages.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1.

The trial court properly allowed Staley to present surveillance video

evidence of Roundy at trial because Roundy never sought discovery of the video tape or any
other type of surveillance evidence through available discovery methods. Furthermore, the trial
court properly allowed Gunderson testify as a "rebuttal" witness to lay foundation for the
surveillance video tape.
2.

The trial court properly denied Roundy's Motion for New Trial, which

was based on Roundy's assertion that admission of the surveillance video evidence was an
"accident or surprise which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against." Roundy could
have guarded against admission of the surveillance evidence had she testified candidly regarding
her physical injuries and damages. Moreover, Roundy could have guarded against the video
surveillance evidence by using available discovery methods to learn of its existence.
3.

The trial court properly denied Roundy's Motion for New Trial, which

was based on Roundy's assertion that "irregularity in the proceedings" occurred. Roundy fails to
identify any "irregularity in the proceedings" or to provide legal support for her assertion that the
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admission of surveillance evidence, that is not requested in discovery, should be considered
"irregularity in the proceedings."
4.

The trial court properly denied Roundy's Motion for New Trial, which

was based on Roundy's assertion that "error in the law" occurred in this case. Roundy fails to
provide legal support for her assertion that the admission of surveillance evidence, that is not
requested in discovery, should be considered an "error in the law." Moreover, assuming that an
error occurred with regard to the surveillance evidence which was used to rebut Roundy's lack
of candor about her injuries, Roundy is not entitled to a new trial because this evidence
addressed only the damages element of Roundy's case. The jury did not go beyond the liability
element of Roundy's claims to reach the issue of damages in its deliberations. Thus, the "error,"
if any, was harmless.
5.

The trial court properly granted Staley's motion for directed verdict on

Roundy's cause of action for punitive damages. The overwhelming evidence presented at trial
was that Staley entered the intersection where the accident took place on a green or yellow light
and that Roundy made an improper left turn across Staley's travel lane in violation of Utah Code
Ann. section 41-6-73. Roundy also failed to establish that Staley was speeding or that he should
be held to a higher standard of care than other drivers simply because he was driving a suburban
at the time of the accident. As a result, Roundy was unable to establish her punitive damage
claim by clear and convincing evidence.

11

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY ALLOWED STALEY TO PRESENT
SURVEILLANCE VIDEO EVIDENCE OF ROUNDY AT TRIAL.
A.

Staley had No Obligation to Produce the Surveillance Video Tape, Nor to Disclose
its Existence Prior to Trial, Because Roundy Never Requested Surveillance
Evidence in Discovery.
A review of Roundy's relevant written discovery requests reveals that Roundy

never asked Staley to produce the surveillance video tape or even about the existence of
surveillance evidence. Moreover, after receiving Staley's responses to these written discovery
requests Roundy never filed a motion to compel additional information about surveillance video
tape evidence or about Staley's trial witnesses. Even though Roundy never asked for this
information in discovery she asserts she was "ambushed" and "surprised" by surveillance video
evidence that was presented by Staley at trial. Roundy also asserts that the trial court erred in
refusing to protect Roundy from the effect of this surveillance video evidence which shows
Roundy engaged in physical activities that contradict her testimony regarding the injuries and
physical limitations that she claims resulted from the accident.
In Feola v. Egan^ 1998 WL 666964 (Conn. Super. Ct.) the plaintiff made a similar
argument. In Feola the plaintiff brought action for personal injuries that she claimed resulted
from a motor vehicle accident. The trial court allowed the defendant to present surveillance
video tape evidence during trial. On appeal, the plaintiff asserted that admission of the video
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tape evidence was error because it had not been disclosed prior to trial. The court disagreed
holding that because the plaintiff had not asked the defendant to reveal the existence of
surveillance video tape evidence in any interrogatory or discovery proceeding, the defendant had
no obligation to reveal its existence.
Similarly, in Detiller v. Smith, 638 So.2d 445 (La. Ct. App. 1994), the court was
asked to address whether the plaintiff was prejudiced and unfairly surprised by the admission of
surveillance video tape evidence that was made of the plaintiff during the course of trial. The
video shows the plaintiff on a trial lunch break during which she removes a cervical collar that
she had worn in the courtroom. In the video the plaintiff turns her head from side to side and
tilts her head back as she drinks a soft drink. This evidence directly contradicted the plaintiffs
testimony that she was in constant pain and that her weakness was so great that the only things
she could do for herself was feed herself and go to the bathroom. Id. at 448. The court held that
because the plaintiff had not submitted specific discovery requests that sought to obtain, or even
inquired regarding the existence of surveillance video tape evidence, the defendant had no duty
to produce the video tape and the evidence was admissible at trial.
Finally, in Kiss v. Jacob, 633 A.2d 544 (N.J. Ct. App. 1993), overruled on other
grounds, 650 A.2d 336 (N.J. 1994), the court addressed the situation where the plaintiffs did not
request surveillance evidence eventhough they knew of its existence. In Kiss the plaintiffs asked
about the existence of surveillance photographs in their written discovery requests to the
defendant. In his initial response, the defendant stated that no such evidence existed. The
13

defendant later supplemented his response to indicate that he had subsequently obtained
surveillance evidence. Thereafter, the plaintiffs never requested the surveillance evidence which
was admitted at trial. On appeal, the plaintiffs claimed they were unfairly surprised by the
surveillance evidence and that the defendant had a discovery obligation to produce the
surveillance evidence eventhough it had not been requested after it was disclosed to the
plaintiffs. The court disagreed holding that absent a specific discovery request for the
surveillance evidence, the defendant had no obligation to produce it. Id. at 547.
In accordance with the holdings of these cases Staley had no obligation to provide
Roundy surveillance video evidence because it was never requested by Roundy. Furthermore, if
Roundy was dissatisfied with Staley's responses to her discovery requests Roundy5 s remedy
would have been to file a motion to compel. Roundy did not file a motion to compel and did not
take any action to discover whether there was surveillance evidence. Roundy cannot complain
of unfair surprise when she did nothing to determine the existence of surveillance evidence
through available discovery methods.
The few cases cited by Roundy in her Opening Brief do not support her argument
that Staley had a duty to produce the surveillance video tape when it was not specifically
requested. In fact, only two of these cases involve surveillance video tape evidence.
The first case, Dodson v. Persell, 390 So.2d 704 (Fla. 1980), actually supports
Staley's assertions in this matter. In Dodson the plaintiff submitted specific interrogatories to
"discover whether surveillance of the [plaintiff] had taken place, whether photographs or movies
14

were taken, and, if so, the time and place taken, the substance of what the films purported to
show, and the qualifications of the photographer." The defendant objected to the request on the
basis of the work product privilege and refused to produce the requested materials. The plaintiff
then filed a motion to compel responses to these specific discovery requests, which was denied.
Surveillance materials were presented at trial. On appeal the court held, "upon request a party
must reveal the existence of any surveillance information he possesses whether or not it is
intended to be presented at trial." (Emphasis added.)
In the present case Roundy did not inquire regarding the existence of surveillance
evidence or seek to obtain the surveillance video tape. Roundy did not seek to compel discovery
from Staley as was done in Dodson. Moreover, as the Dodson court held, the surveillance video
tape of Roundy was privileged work product until it was decided that it would be used at trial.
{See also, Grossman v. Emergency Cesspool and Sewer Cleaners, Inc., 617 N.Y.S.2d 422
(1994); Ranft v. Lyons, All N.W.2d 254 (Wis. Ct. App. 1991). This decision was not made until
Roundy took the stand and testified inconsistent with her actual physical activities. Roundy
cannot now complain that the trial court erred in allowing the admission of this evidence, nor can
she complain that she was prejudiced by evidence of her own conduct that contradicts her
testimony regarding her injuries and damages
In the second case cited by Roundy, Lascano v. Vowell, 940 P.2d 977 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1996), the parties were required by rule to submit disclosure certificates including "a
description, attached copy, or photograph of any exhibit that he or she might offer at trial" at
15

least 90 days before trial. Supplementation was required by rule at least 80 days before trial.
Defendant obtained a surveillance video tape of plaintiff and attempted to include it as an exhibit
after the disclosure deadlines. The court would not allow the admission of the evidence because
the defendant had failed to disclose it prior to the deadlines.
In the present case there is no rule that required Staley to designate trial exhibits
or witnesses by a particular deadline. The trial court did not impose a deadline for the disclosure
of trial exhibits or trial witnesses. Roundy never requested information regarding surveillance
evidence in her discovery requests. Roundy never submitted a motion to compel additional
discovery from Staley for the responses in which she was dissatisfied. Roundy's own failure to
use available discovery methods to obtain information regarding surveillance evidence does not
support her assertions that she was "ambushed" and "surprised" by surveillance video evidence
presented by Staley at trial. Accordingly, Staley had no obligation to disclose the existence of
the surveillance video or to produce it to Roundy.
B.

Gunderson's Testimony and the Surveillance Video Tape Were Rebuttal Evidence.
In Feola v. Egan, 1998 WL 666964 (Conn. Super. Ct), the Connecticut Superior

Court upheld the trial court's admission of video surveillance evidence of the plaintiff that had
not been disclosed prior to trial. The court also held that the trial court did not err in allowing a
private investigator, who was not disclosed as a trial witness, to testify regarding the surveillance
video tape, and about plaintiffs behavior that he observed that was not included on the video
tape. Id. at 449. The court held the private investigator was a rebuttal fact witness.
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Roundy cites Turner v. Nelson, 872 P.2d 1021 (Utah 1994), in support of her
assertion that Gunderson, who prepared and testified regarding the surveillance video tape of
Roundy, cannot be considered a rebuttal witness. In Turner the plaintiff attempted to call a
witness to "rebut" evidence from the defendant that a stop sign was partially obstructed at an
intersection where the automobile giving rise to the action occurred. The plaintiff asserted that
this defense was a surprise and the witness she intended to call was a rebuttal witness. Id. at
1023. On appeal the Utah Supreme Court held that the trial court had the discretion to order the
parties to disclose all potential witnesses prior to trial, which it had done. The Court also held
that the trial court "had all of the evidence before it and was in the best position to determine
whether [plaintiff] could reasonably have anticipated the obstructed-sign testimony." The court
held it would not reverse the trial court unless the plaintiff could demonstrate that the trial court
had clearly abused its discretion and thereby affected the plaintiffs rights. Id. at 1023-1024.
Because the trial court had ordered the parties to disclose all witnesses prior to trial and because
plaintiff "knew or should have anticipated that [defendant] would claim the sign was
obstructed,"1 the appellate court held it had properly precluded the plaintiff from calling the
previously undisclosed witness.

]

The Court noted that the defendant had designated a "traffic design expert" witness and
a fact witness to the accident who both testified that the stop sign at the intersection where the
accident took place was obstructed. Id. at 1025. Thus, the plaintiff had prior notice of this
defense.
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In this case the trial court also had all of the evidence before it and was in the best
position to determine whether Gunderson should have been allowed to testify as a rebuttal
witness regarding his surveillance of Roundy. Furthermore, Staley did not know if Roundy
would testify candidly regarding her injuries and physical limitations until she actually presented
her testimony at trial. That is why when Gunderson was disclosed on the first day of trial, he
was identified only as a "possible" witness. When Roundy failed to be forthright in her
testimony counsel for Staley called Gunderson and presented the surveillance video tape
evidence to rebut Roundy's testimony.
Roundy also cites Perez-Perez v. Popular Leasing Rental, Inc., 993 F.2d 281 (1st
Cir. 1993) and Smith v. FordMotor Co, 626 F.2d 784 (10th Cir. 1980), for the proposition that it
is error for a trial court to allow a previously undisclosed witness to testify at trial. Neither of
these cases involve surveillance video tape evidence. In Perez-Perez the court held it was
improper for the trial court to allow the plaintiff to call a previously undisclosed medical expert
witness to testify at trial regarding the defendant's eyesight. The court noted that this witness
introduced, for the first time, a novel theory of liability in the case. Thus, the defendant had no
time to review any records or conduct discovery regarding this theory. Id. at 286 -287.
Likewise, in Smith v. FordMotor Co. the court held that the defendant was unfairly prejudiced
because the trial court allowed the plaintiff to call a previously undisclosed medical expert
witness at trial to present a completely new and unexpected liability theory. Id. at 797.
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In the present case neither Gunderson nor the surveillance video tape introduced a
new theory of liability to the case. They simply presented facts regarding Roundy's own
behavior which was relevant to Roundy's damage claims. This evidence, which counters
Roundy's trial testimony regarding the severity of her physical injuries and her damage claims,
is the classic form of rebuttal evidence because it shows Roundy contradicting herself through
her own actions.

POINT n
THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY DENIED ROUNDY'S MOTION FOR NEW
TRIAL, WHICH WAS BASED ON HER ASSERTION THAT AN ACCIDENT OR
SURPRISE OCCURRED WHICH ORDINARY PRUDENCE COULD NOT HAVE
GUARDED AGAINST.
Rule 59(a)(3) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a new trial
"may" be granted on the basis of "accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have
guarded against." In Anderson v. Bradley, 590 P.2d 339 (Utah 1979), the Utah Supreme Court
held that a surprise which could have been guarded against by the utilization of available
discovery methods, such as a motion to compel, may not serve as grounds for a new trial under
this provision.
Roundy asserts that Staley's use of Gunderson and the surveillance video tape
evidence was a surprise which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against and that she is
therefore entitled to a new trial. Contrary to Roundy's assertion, Roundy could have guarded
against the "surprise" of this evidence had she testified honestly and consistently regarding her
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physical injuries and damages. She did not. Moreover, even if the Court considers the
surveillance evidence a surprise, Roundy had an opportunity to guard against it using available
discovery methods. Roundy could have inquired specifically regarding the existence of
surveillance evidence. She did not. Roundy also could have submitted a motion to compel to
inquire further about Staley's anticipated trial witnesses. She did not. Accordingly, the trial
court properly denied Roundy's Motion for New Trial which was based on Rule 59(a)(3) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

POINT m
THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY DENIED ROUNDY5 S MOTION FOR NEW
TRIAL, WHICH WAS BASED ON HER ASSERTION THAT "IRREGULARITY IN
THE PROCEEDINGS" OCCURRED.
Roundy also asserts that she is entitled to a new trial pursuant to Rule 59(a)(1) of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. This rule states that a new trial "may" be granted if the court
determines that there was "[i]rregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or adverse party, or
any order of the court, or abuse of discretion by which either party was prevented from having a
fair trial." Roundy, however, fails to make even one reference to the record to support the
allegation that "irregularities" occurred. Instead, Roundy vaguely refers to the record as a whole
and concludes that the non-disclosure of the surveillance evidence was "most 'irregular'".
(Roundy Opening Brief at 20.) Roundy also fails to provide legal support for her assertion that
the admission of rebuttal surveillance evidence, that was not sought in discovery, should be
considered an irregularity in the proceedings that entitles her to a new trial. Accordingly, the
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trial court properly denied Roundy's Motion for new trial which was based on the unsupported
assertion that an irregularity occurred that prevented her from having a fair trial.
POINT IV
THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY DENIED ROUNDY'S MOTION FOR
NEW TRIAL, WHICH WAS BASED ON HER ASSERTION THAT "ERROR
IN THE LAW" OCCURRED.
Rule 59(a)(7) provides that the trial court "may" grant a new trial if it determines
that an u[e]rror in the law" has occurred. The "error" to which Roundy refers is the trial court's
admission of surveillance evidence. Roundy fails to provide legal support for her assertion that
the admission of rebuttal surveillance evidence, that was not sought by Roundy in discovery is
error in the law.
Furthermore, Rule 59(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a new
trial may be granted only if one of the several circumstances discussed by Rule 59 exists, and
"subject to the provisions of Rule 61 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure." By Rule 61, even if
an error has been committed, a new trial may not be granted if the error is harmless. The Utah
Supreme Court has held that "an error is harmful only if the likelihood of a different outcome is
sufficiently high as to undermine [the appellate court's] confidence in the verdict." Crookston v.
Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 789, 796 (Utah 1991).
InMcDougalv. McCammon, 455 S.E.2d 788 (W.V. 1995), the sole issue before
the court on appeal was whether the trial court improperly admitted surveillance video evidence
of one of the plaintiffs. The surveillance evidence was not disclosed to the plaintiffs prior to
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trial, even though they had expressly requested such evidence in discovery. The Supreme Court
of West Virginia characterized this evidence as contradiction or rebuttal in nature, and was
therefore admissible to impeach the plaintiff. Id. at 795. The court also held that the defendant
had violated discovery rules in failing to produce the surveillance video because it had been
requested in discovery. However, the court held that the surveillance video evidence was
relevant only to the issue of damages. Because the jury returned a verdict in favor of the
defendant on the liability issue, and did not reach the issue of damages, the admission of the
surveillance video tape was harmless error. The court stated, "[i]n conclusion, we hold that
although the admission of the video tape may have been error, because the video tape in dispute
did not affect the question of liability, its admission was not reversible error." Id. at 799.
Assuming, arguendo, that an error was committed in this case with regard to the
admission of surveillance evidence which was used to rebut Roundy's lack of candor about her
injuries, Roundy is not entitled to a new trial because this evidence only addressed the damages
element of Roundy's case. The jury did not go beyond the liability element of Roundy's claims
to reach the issue of damages in its deliberations. Instead, it determined that Roundy was 60% at
fault for the accident. Thus, the alleged error raised by Roundy was harmless and her assertion
that the trial court committed reversible error in denying her Motion for New Trial is groundless.
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POINT V
THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY GRANTED STALEY5 S MOTION FOR
DIRECTED VERDICT ON ROUNDY'S CAUSE OF ACTION FOR PUNITIVE
DAMAGES,
Punitive damages may be awarded only under limited circumstances as set forth
by Utah Code Ann. Section 78-18-l(l)(a):
Except as otherwise provided by statute, punitive damages may be
awarded only if compensatory or general damages are awarded and
it is established by clear and convincing evidence that the acts or
omissions of the tortfeasor are the result of willful and malicious or
intentionally fraudulent conduct, or conduct that manifests a
knowing and reckless indifference toward, and disregard of, the
rights of others.
In Behrens v. Raleigh Hills Hosp., Inc., 675 P.2d 1179 (Utah 1983) the Utah
Supreme Court cautioned that punitive damages should be awarded in the infrequent,
exceptional case and that "[s]imple negligence will never suffice as a basis upon which punitive
damages may be awarded."
The basis for Roundy's punitive damage claim prior to trial was that it was
reckless disregard for Staley to enter an intersection, driving a suburban, knowing the traffic
signal had turned red. Roundy took three days of the four-day trial to present evidence in
support of her assertion. She called numerous witnesses to support her claims. Contrary to
Roundy's allegations, the evidence presented established that the traffic signal was green or
yellow when Staley entered the intersection and that Staley was traveling within the speed limit.
Even Roundy admits that she was the only witness of the many called at trial that testified
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otherwise. (Roundy Opening Brief at 8-9.) Roundy also failed to establish that Staley should be
held to a higher standard of care than other drivers simply because he was driving a suburban at
the time of the accident. At the conclusion of her case the trial court directed verdict on
Roundy's punitive damage claim because Roundy could not establish the evidence to support
this claim by clear and convincing evidence. The trial court's determination on this claim was
proper. Staley's operation of a vehicle of the size and weight of a van or pickup truck, into an
intersection on a green or yellow traffic light, within the speed limit, cannot be considered
unreasonable conduct or an extreme departure from ordinary care. This conclusion is also
supported by the fact that the jury returned a verdict in favor of Staley on the issue of liability.
Accordingly, the trial court's grant of directed verdict in favor of Staley at the conclusion of
Roundy's case was proper and should be upheld on appeal.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Staley respectfully urges this Court not to disturb the
jury verdict rendered in this case, and to affirm the judgment of the trial court and its order
denying Roundy's Motion for New Trial.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

/

day of December, 1998.

RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER
& NELSON

DkUKX
LYNN S. DAVES
CHRISTIAN W. NELSON
Attorneys for Defendant/Respondent
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that eight true and correct copies of the foregoing Brief of
Appellant was hand delivered to the Court of Appeals and two true and correct copies of the^
foregoing Brief of Appellant was mailed, first-class, postage prepaid to counsel, on this [ ~
day of December, 1998.

6016-151P-228355
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LYNNS. DAVIES [A0824]
CHRISTIAN W. NELSON [A5771]
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON
Attorneys for Defendants
Key Bank Tower, Seventh Floor
50 So. Main Street
P.O. Box 2465
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2465
Telephone: (801)531-2000
Fax No.: (801)532-5506

rN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

LAINA ROUND Y,
Plaintiff,

JUDGMENT
Civil No. 940906068

vs.
NEIL STALEY,

Judge David S. Young

Defendant.
The above-captioned action was tried to a jury of eight, the Honorable David S.
Young presiding, on May 8-9 and May 13-15, 1997. Plaintiff was represented by her attorney
Peter C. Collins; defendant was represented by his attorney, Lynn S. Davies. At the conclusion
of the trial, the jury answered and returned a Special Verdict, responding to the questions as
follows:
1.

Was Defendant, Travis Staley, negligent?

ANSWER:

Yes

X

No

2.

Was Travis Staley's negligence a proximate cause of the injuries sustained

by Plaintiff Laina Roundy9
ANSWER:
3.

No

Yes

X

No

Was Laina Roundy's negligence a proximate cause of her own injuries?

ANSWER:
5.

X

Was Plaintiff, Laina Roundy, negligent?

ANSWER:
4.

Yes

Yes

X

No

Assuming that the total negligence of the parties equals 100%, state the

percentage of negligence attributed to each party.
Travis Staley

40

%

Laina Roundy

60

%

TOTAL

100%

The jury was then polled, with all eight jurors affirming that this was in fact their verdict
as to Questions Nos. 1-4, and seven jurors affirming that this was in fact their verdict as to
Question No. 5.
Based on the foregoing findings of the jury, and good cause appearing therefor, the Court
hereby enters judgment as follows:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that judgment is hereby entered in favor of
defendant, Travis Staley, no cause of action. The issue of costs is reserved for future
consideration.

DATED this

i!^3

ay of

n

, 1997
THE COURT

THE HONO
THIRD DIST

Costs $

APPROVED AS TO FORM:
BUGDEN,«pLLINS & MORTON

L. "iizzteT..

PETER C COLLINS^
Attorneys for Plaintiff
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing instrument
was mailed, first-class, postage prepaid, on this j ^
day of -<V< ili^u
, 1997, to the
following
John Edward Hansen
SCALLEY & READING
261 East 300 South, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

(y^da

6016-1519
15369'
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LYNNS. DAVffiS [A0824]
CHRISTIAN W. NELSON [A5771]
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON
Attorneys for Defendants
Key Bank Tower, Seventh Floor
50 South Main Street
P.O. Box 2465
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2465
Telephone: (801)531-2000
Fax No.: (801)532-5506

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
LAINA ROUNDY,
Plaintiff,
vs.
TRAVIS STALEY,

ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION
FOR NEW TRIAL AND ON
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL
JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING
THE VERDICT

Defendant.

Civil No. 940906068
Judge David S. Young

Plaintiffs Motion for New Trial and her Motion for Partial Judgment
Notwithstanding the Verdict came on for hearing on September 5, 1997 before the above
referenced Court. Plaintiff was represented by her counsel, Peter Collins. Defendant was
represented by his counsel, Lynn S. Davies. After review of Plaintiffs Motions and the
supporting memoranda thereto, Defendant's memorandum in opposition thereto, and argument
presented by the parties, the Court hereby finds that:

1.

Plaintiff fails to cite to any reference in the record to support her claim

that "irregularities" or "errors of law" occurred during the course of the trial. There was
sufficient evidence to justify the jury verdict considering the evidence presented at trial.
2.

The Court considers Mr. Ron Gunderson's trial testimony and the related

surveillance videotape he presented at trial to be evidence which Plaintiff, with ordinary
prudence, could have learned of and guarded against. Plaintiff could have learned about
Mr. Gunderson and the evidence he presented by submitting a Motion to Compel discovery from
Defendant if she was not satisfied with the answers Defendant provided regarding his intended
trial witnesses. Furthermore, the Court considers Mr. Gunderson and the evidence he presented
to be evidence in rebuttal to Plaintiffs testimony regarding her physical injuries and damages.
3.

Any error that took place at trial is harmless considering the fact that the

jury reached its verdict on the basis of liability and the issues raised by Plaintiff in her Motion
for New Trial and Motion for Partial Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict address her injury
and damage claims.
Accordingly, the Court denies Plaintiffs Motion for New Trial and Plaintiffs
Motion for Partial Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict.
DATED this / ^ d a y of Am0-&*i&g5?

, 1997.

BY THE COURT:

The Honorable David S. Young
Third District Court
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Approved as to Form:
BUGDEN, COLLINS & MORTON

Peter C! Collins
Attorneys for Plaintiff

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing instrument
was mailed, first-class, postage prepaid, on this i'jS) 'day of Qc- A r ^Ly^~
1997, to the
following:

Peter C. Collins
BUGDEN, COLLINS & MORTON
4021 South 700 East, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
John E. Hansen
SCALLEY & READING
261 East 300 South, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

*r

/ / <ncu£r
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ROUNDY, LAINA
ROUNDY, THOR
PLAINTIFF,
-VS-

SCHEDULING ORDER AND
TRIAL NOTICE
CASE NO.

STALEY, NEIL
STALEY, TRAVIS

940906068 CV

HONORABLE DAVID S. YOUNG
DEFENDANT.

PURSUANT TO THE SCHEDULING CONFERENCE HELD ON 1-24-97
THE FOLLOWING DATES WERE SET AND MATTERS DISCUSSED:
1.
THIS CASE IS SET FOR TRIAL ON MAY 8, 1997 AT 10:00 A.M.
2.
ANTICIPATED TRIAL TIME IS 04 DAYS.
3.
THE CASE IS SET FOR JURY TRIAL. COUNSEL ARE TO
SUBMIT AN AGREED SET OF JURY INSTRUCTIONS TO THE COURT BY
. OBJECTED TO INSTRUCTIONS ARE TO BE SUBMITTED
SEPARATKLY
4.
ALL DISCOVERY INCLUDING RESPONSES MUST BE CONCLUDED BY
(DISCOVERY CUTOFF 10-31-96)
5.
ALL DISPOSITIVE MOTIONS ARE TO BE HEARD BY
6.
EXHIBIT AND WITNESS LISTS ARE TO BE EXCHANGED BY
7.
A FINAL PRETRIAL SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE WILL BE HELD ON
APRIL 30, 1997
AT 8:00 A .M. TRIAL COUNSEL AND CLIENTS, OR
AN INDIVIDUAL WITH AUTHORITY TO SETTLE THIS CASE ARE TO BE
PRESENT. OUT OF STATE PARTIES MUST BE AVAILABLE BY PHONE AT THE
TIME OF THE PRETRIAL SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE.
8.
FAILURE TO APPEAR AT THE PRETRIAL SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE
MAY RESULT IN A DEFAULT.
9.
THE FOREGOING DATES SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FIRM SETTINGS
AND WILL NOT BE MODIFIED WITHOUT COURT ORDER, AND THEN ONLY
UPON A SHOWING OF MANIFEST INJUSTICE. COUNSEL ARE INSTRUCTED TO
STAY IN CONTACT WITH THE CLERK OF THIS COURT AS THE TRIAL DATE
APPROACHES REGARDING THE TRIAL SETTING.
11. OTHER MATTERS: DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT IS DENIED
DATED THIS 24TH DAY OF JANU
97.

*fi}jA
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
COPIES MAILED TO PARTIES AT THE ADDRESSES INDICATED ON THE
ATTACHED MAILING CERTIFICATE.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT I MAILED A TRUE AND CORRECT COPY OF THE
ATTACHED SCHEDULING ORDER AND TRIAL NOTICE, BY FIRST CLASS MAIL,
POSTAGE PREPAID, TO THE FOLLOWING:

COLLINS, PETER Q.
ATTORNEY FOR DEPENDANT
4021 SOUTH 700 EAST
#400
SALT LAKE CITY
UT 84107

DATED THIS

DAVIES, LYNN S.
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF
50 SOUTH MAIN, #700
P. O. BOX 2465
SALT LAKE CITY
UT 84110

DAY O

DEPUTY C:

